Rule 3.3. Candor toward the tribunal.
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law
to a tribunal;
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by the client;
(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel; or
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to
the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires
disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the
lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform
the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable
the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts
are adverse.
COMMENT
The advocate's task is to present the client's case
with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences
of the client is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal.
However, an advocate does not vouch for the evidence submitted in a
cause; the tribunal is responsible for assessing its probative value.
Representations by a Lawyer
An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other
documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have
personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents
ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's
behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However,
an assertion surporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an
affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly
be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes
it to be true on the basis of reasonably diligent inquiry. There are
circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of
an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule
1.2(c) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing
a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(c),
see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b).
Misleading Legal Argument
Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation
of law constitutes dishonesty toward a tribunal. A lawyer is not required
to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the
existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in
paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse
authority in the controlling jurisdiction which has not been disclosed
by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument
is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable
to the case.
False Evidence
When evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is provided
by a person who is not the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer it
regardless of the client's wishes.
When false evidence is offered by the client, however,
a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to keep the client's
revelations confidential and the duty of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining
that material evidence is false, the lawyer should seek to persuade
the client that the evidence should not be offered or, if it has been
offered, that its false character should immediately be disclosed. If
the persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial
measures.
Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule
generally recognized is that, if necessary to rectify the situation,
an advocate must disclose the existence of the client's deception to
the court or to the other party. Such a disclosure can result in grave
consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but
also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the
alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby
subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed
to implement. See Rule 1.2(c). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood
that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of
false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to
reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus
the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud
on the court.
Perjury by a Criminal Defendant
Whether an advocate for a criminally accused has the
same duty of disclosure has been intensely debated. While it is agreed
that the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to refrain from perjurious
testimony, there has been dispute concerning the lawyer's duty when
that persuasion fails. If the confrontation with the client occurs before
trial, the lawyer ordinarily can withdraw. Withdrawal before trial may
not be possible, however, either because trial is imminent, or because
the confrontation with the client does not take place until the trial
itself, or because no other counsel is available.
The most difficult situation, therefore, arises in
a criminal case where the accused insists on testifying when the lawyer
knows that the testimony is perjurious. The lawyer's effort to rectify
the situation can increase the likelihood of the client's being convicted
as well as opening the possibility of prosecution for perjury. On the
other hand, if the lawyer does not exercise control over the proof,
the lawyer participates, although in a merely passive way, in deception
of the court.
Three resolutions of this dilemma have been proposed.
One is to permit the accused to testify by a narrative without guidance
through the lawyer's questioning. This compromises both contending principles;
it exempts the lawyer from the duty to disclose false evidence but subjects
the client to an implicit disclosure of information imparted to counsel.
Another suggested resolution, of relatively recent origin, is that the
advocate be entirely excused from the duty to reveal perjury if the
perjury is that of the client. This is a coherent solution but makes
the advocate a knowing instrument of perjury.
The other resolution of the dilemma is that the lawyer
must reveal the client's perjury if necessary to rectify the situation.
A criminal accused has a right to the assistance of an advocate, a right
to testify and a right of confidential communication with counsel. However,
an accused should not have a right to assistance of counsel in committing
perjury. Furthermore, an advocate has an obligation, not only in professional
ethics but under the law as well, to avoid implication in the commission
of perjury or other falsification of evidence. See Rule 1.2(c).
Remedial Measures
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered,
the advocate's proper course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client
confidentially. If that fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw
if that will remedy the situation. If withdrawal will not remedy the
situation or is impossible, the advocate should make disclosure to the
court. It is for the court then to determine what should be done - making
a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial
or perhaps nothing. If the false testimony was that of the client, the
client may controvert the lawyer's version of their communication when
the lawyer discloses the situation to the court. If there is an issue
whether the client has committed perjury, the lawyer cannot represent
the client in resolution of the issue, and a mistrial may be unavoidable.
An unscrupulous client might in this way attempt to produce a series
of mistrials and thus escape prosecution. However, a second such encounter
could be construed as a deliberate abuse of the right to counsel and
as such a waiver of the right to further representation.
Constitutional Requirements
The general rule - that an advocate must disclose the
existence of perjury with respect to a material fact, even that of a
client - applies to defense counsel in criminal cases, as well as in
other instances. However, the definition of the lawyer's ethical duty
in such a situation may be qualified by constitutional provisions for
due process and the right to counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions
these provisions have been construed to require that counsel present
an accused as a witness if the accused wishes to testify, even if counsel
knows the testimony will be false. The obligation of the advocate under
these Rules is subordinate to such a constitutional requirement.
Duration of Obligation
A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify
the presentation of false evidence has to be established. The conclusion
of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination
of the obligation.
Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to be False
Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse
to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer believes is untrustworthy.
Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to
discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's
effectiveness as an advocate. In criminal cases, however, a lawyer may,
in some jurisdictions, be denied this authority by constitutional requirements
governing the right to counsel.
Ex Parte Proceedings
Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility
of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider
in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented
by the opposing party. However, in an ex parte proceeding, such as an
application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of
presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding
is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has
an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration.
The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make
disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer
reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision.
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