(Approved December 5, 1997)
Issue: May an attorney finance the
expected costs of a case by borrowing money from a non-lawyer pursuant
to a non-recourse promissory note, where the note is secured by the
attorney's interest in his contingent fee in the case?
Conclusion: An attorney's grant of
a security interest in a contingent fee from a particular case to secure
a loan constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer in violation
of Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 5.4(a).
Facts: "Attorney" has consulted
with a private individual who is not an attorney ("Lender").
Lender proposes to loan to Attorney an agreed-on amount to be used for
costs and expenses in pursuing a matter on behalf of Attorney's client
("Client"). Attorney and Client have a contingent-fee agreement
under which Attorney is responsible for costs, and under which Attorney
is entitled to a percentage of the recovery. A promissory note would
be executed under which an interest rate would be calculated on the
basis of the risk of loss of the case and the fact that Attorney's portion
of the recovery would be the only source of repayment of the funds.
Funds would be disbursed by Attorney in periodic draws as expenses were
incurred.
The loan agreement would also state that Attorney would
pay Lender the first proceeds of his share of any recovery until the
amount of the note, plus interest, was paid. However, the loan would
be "nonrecourse" to Attorney; that is, in the event the loan
is not repaid, the Attorney could not be held personally liable by Lender
for repayment. As security for the loan, Attorney would assign to Lender
his interest in the contingent-fee agreement with Client. A security
agreement and financing statement would be signed and proper filings
with the appropriate authorities would be made to perfect Lender's security
interest. Client would specifically consent to the loan in writing.
Lender would agree that he has no right to direct or influence the litigation,
that his sole contact with Attorney would be for Attorney to report
on the progress of the case, and that Lender could audit expenses paid
from loan proceeds for genuineness.
Analysis: Except in certain circumstances,
none of which apply to the matter before us, Rule 5.4(a)
prohibits a lawyer or law firm from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer.1The
Comment to Rule 5.4 states that
the rule "expresses traditional limitations on sharing fees,"
and that "[t]hese limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional
independence of judgment."
Lender contends that the proposed arrangement does
not involve "fees," because it is merely the repayment of
"costs." We disagree. First, the proposed source of repayment
is from Attorney's share of the award under the contingent-fee agreement
with Client. Attorney agreed to accept responsibility to pay costs and
took the risk that he would not recover them out of his share of the
award. For our purposes, all of his receipts are "fees." Even
if we were to view the first funds coming to Attorney as reimbursement
of costs, however, it is clear that, due to the interest factor on the
loan, some amounts from the pure "fee" portion of the recovery
could have to be paid to Lender to pay the note in full.
Lender also contends that, because Attorney has merely
agreed to repay the loan with interest, as opposed to granting a percentage
in legal fees received, the proposed loan is merely like any other non-recourse
loan. Again, we disagree.2We
are not troubled by the fact that Attorney needs to borrow funds to
run his practice. Many attorneys and firms borrow money and grant security
interests in their accounts receivable generally as collateral for the
loan. Likewise, it is axiomatic that most attorneys' primary, if not
sole, source of revenue is from fees generated from matters undertaken
on behalf of clients. Taken to its logical extreme, a Rule 5.4
prohibition on lawyers' meeting their loan repayment obligations from
fees received would mean not only the lawyers could not borrow money
to run their practices, but that they could not pay for any goods or
services on credit.3
However, once a security interest in the recovery of
contingent fees from a particular case is granted, Rule 5.4
is implicated.4Upon
that grant, Lender has an interest in the attorney's contingent-fee
award, which Lender has the right to attach upon a default in payment
on the loan. That particularized interest in the contingent fees of
a case could compromise the lawyer's judgment in a number of ways. For
example, the lawyer's judgment may be impaired in drawing up the proposed
budget for expenses. He may be influenced in recommending that a client
accept a settlement offer because of the impact it may have on the repayment
of the debt with Lender. The fact that Lender may agree not to be involved
in decisions involving the case or that Client may agree in writing
and in advance does not save the proposed arrangement, as Rule 5.4(a)
makes no exception for such cases.5
Accordingly, we find that an attorney may not finance
the costs of a contingent-fee case in which a non-recourse promissory
note is secured by the attorney's interest in the contingent fee.
Footnotes
1.(a) A
lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except
that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm,
partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a
reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's
estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished
legal business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased
lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents
the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees
in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based
in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 5.4(a).
2.See
In re Van Cura, 504 N.W.2d 610 (Wis. 1993) (unethical fee splitting
found when law firm agreed to finance its product-liability litigation
with nonlawyer consulting firm in return for which consulting firm would
receive half the fees received from such cases).
3.See
ABA Formal Op. 320 (1968), which held a financing plan did not
constitute a per se violation of Rule 5.4
where a lawyer charged a client a fixed fee, took a promissory note
for the fee, and then sold the note to a bank at a discounted price.
The note was endorsed to the bank "without recourse," and
the attorney had the right to repurchase the note prior to the bank's
instituting any legal action on it. The plan, however, specifically
excluded contingent fees.
4.See
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. No. 139,
1994 WL 579849 ("[P]rovided no other rule of professional conduct
is violated, compensation of non-lawyer employees may be based upon
a percentage of gross or net income so long as it is not tied to the
fees from a particular case.")
5. If neither
Lender nor Client is an attorney, the Rules of Professional Conduct
would not apply to them, and a loan transaction between Lender and Client,
where Client signs the promissory note and secures the note by granting
a security interest in his share of the recovery, would not violate
the Rules. We caution, however, that attorneys should be aware of Rule
8.4(a), which provides that a lawyer
may not "violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through
the acts of another."
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