(Approved March 10, 1994)
Issue: The Office of the Utah Attorney
General has requested an advisory opinion concerning whether the rules
of imputed disqualification apply to that office when it is fulfilling
its duty of representing all state agencies, some of which may be adverse
to each other on certain issues.
Opinion: In these circumstances, the
conflict of interest rules apply only on an attorney-specific basis,
and conflicts in the Office of the Utah Attorney General should not
be imputed to all attorneys in that office. Nevertheless, the conflicts
rules must be fully satisfied on an individual lawyer basis, and the
Attorney General must ensure that attorneys with conflict problems are
removed and screened from the particular representation at issue.
Analysis: Typically, if one attorney
in a firm or office has a conflict of interest, that conflict is imputed
to all attorneys in that office.1For
two main reasons, we conclude that Rule 1.10
of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not apply as broadly to lawyers
working in the Office of the Utah Attorney General.
The Rules of Professional Conduct apparently make no
explicit provision for imputed disqualification in this context. The
comments to Rule 1.10 define "firm"
as "lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers employed in the legal
department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services
organization." This definition does not seem expressly to include
or exclude lawyers in a governmental office such as the Utah Attorney
General.2Therefore,
we turn to a more general analysis.
First, there are constitutional as well as practical
policy reasons for not applying the imputed disqualification rule to
the Office of the Utah Attorney General. The Utah State Constitution
gives the Attorney General the duty of representing the State.3Application
of the imputed disqualification rule to the Attorney General could frustrate,
if not completely preclude, the fulfillment of this constitutional mandate.
Because of the large number of attorneys employed by the Attorney General,
there could be numerous occasions where imputed disqualification would
occur, requiring the retention of private counsel to represent the State.
Additional expense to the taxpayer in these situations could be enormous.
Second, other ethics advisory committees facing a similar
situation issue have reached the same basic conclusion.4Although
some other jurisdictions have reached different results in arguably
similar, but not identical contexts,5we
believe our conclusion here is most appropriate for the circumstances
in which this request for an opinion was raised. Nevertheless, the Office
of the Attorney General may encounter conflicts so pervasive or severe
that the only prudent course of action is to hire outside counsel. Such
circumstances should be judged on a case-by-case basis.
Furthermore, the fact that Rule 1.10
does not apply to the Office of the Attorney General in these circumstances
does not relax the independent application of Rules 1.7,
1.8, 1.9,
and 1.11 to each lawyer in that
office. Any lawyer or supervising lawyer in that office who cannot individually
satisfy the requirements of those rules should not engage in the representation
in question. Moreover, despite being free from the imputed disqualification
rule in these circumstances, the Office of the Attorney General must
adopt procedures to ensure that individual lawyers with conflict problems
are sufficiently removed and screened from those matters so as not to
compromise client confidences or any other purposes related to the representation
as promoted by the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
Footnotes
1.Utah Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.7,
1.8, 1.9
and 1.10.
2.In the
context of movement of lawyers between the government and the private
sector, Rule 1.10 comments note
that "the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously
impaired if Rule 1.10 were applied
to the government." The comments to Rule 1.11(c)
suggest conflicts of a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee
do not serve to disqualify "other lawyers in the agency with which
the lawyer has become associated." See also Rule 1.7
cmt. ("government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government
employees in proceedings in which a government agency is the opposing
party"). Nevertheless, we conclude that the comments are too unclear
on this point to provide a basis for our opinion here.
3.Utah Const.,
Article VI, Section 16.
4.See,
e.g., Opinions of Ethics Comm. of the Mass. Bar Ass'n, Op. 89-4
(1989), ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 901:4604 (city
solicitor allowed to advise city employee about litigation by city against
private party who has previously been represented by another lawyer
in city solicitor's office if the lawyer with the conflict is sufficiently
screened from involvement); Ethics Comm. of N. Car. State Bar Ass'n,
Op. 55 (1989), ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 901:6610
(lawyer who is a member of the attorney general's staff and represents
a state hospital may pursue appeals of Medicaid decisions even though
opposition will be represented by another lawyer from attorney general's
office.)
5.See,
e.g., People v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1981) (attorney general
not allowed to bring suit in its own name on issue where it had previously
given legal advice on same issue to party it was seeking to sue on that
issue).
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