December 2, 2004
Issue: Do the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct preclude
a lawyer from forming a cooperative organization that offers certain
non-legal, but law-related, services such as trust administration and
investment management; referring clients to that organization; and participating
in the organization’s profit sharing?
Opinion: It is not per se unethical for a lawyer to
refer a client to a cooperative organization created by the lawyer to
provide non-legal services and for the lawyer to participate in the
organization’s profit sharing. If the lawyer complies with the
following, then the arrangement is permissible: (1) objectively concludes
that any identifiable conflicts between the lawyer and the cooperative
organization would not materially affect the representation of that
client; (2) affirms in writing to the client that the referral will
not compromise the client’s interests in any way; (3) fairly concludes
that the services provided by the cooperative organization are being
provided at fair and reasonable fees; (4) discloses that the lawyer
will receive a share of profits from the cooperative organization; (5)
advises the client to seek independent counsel as to the referral; and
(6) secures the client’s consent.
Facts: A group of Utah lawyers proposes the formation
of a cooperative organization (the “Co-op”) to offer certain
non-legal, but law-related, foundation and charitable trust services
and products, such as plan designs, administration, wealth enhancement,
insurance and investment management (the “services” and
“products”) for a fee or for customary compensation where
products are involved. The Co-op would serve as the provider. A lawyer-member
of the Co-op would refer a client to the Co-op’s staff, who would,
in turn, arrange to provide the desired services and/or products.
Although the lawyers would be members of the Co-op, the legal services
they would provide to the clients would be independent from the Co-op.
The lawyers would provide and bill for their legal services through
their respective law firms. The billed legal services would not involve
the Co-op in any way. The lawyer-members would receive a proportionate
share of the Co-op’s profits.
Analysis: The most relevant rules to the issue at
hand are Rules 1.7 and 1.8
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.7,1 which provide
in pertinent part:
[Utah] Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
the client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities
to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer’s own
interest, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affect; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation. When representation
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation to each client of the implications of
the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.2
[Utah] Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
(a) A Lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client
or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be
reasonably understood by the client; and
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice
of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.3
[ABA Model] Rule 5.7. Responsibilities regarding Law-Related
Services
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct
with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined
in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from
the lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer
individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable
measures to assume that a person obtaining the law-related services
knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections
of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services
that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance
are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not
prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.4
Here, quite clearly, representation “may be materially limited,”
within the meaning of Rule 1.7(b),
because of at least two potential conflicts. First, there is a potential
conflict between the lawyer’s representation of the client and
the lawyer’s interest in receiving compensation for referrals
to the Co-op. Second, there is a potential conflict between the client’s
interest and a “third person”—namely, the Co op. The
threshold question, then, is under what circumstances, if any, could
a lawyer reasonably seek consent under Rule 1.7(b)(2).
The follow-up question is what disclosures or representations should
the lawyer make to the client, assuming the lawyer can reasonably seek
the client’s consent for the referral to the Co-op.
This Committee has addressed and decided this issue as applied to
lawyer referrals to investment advisors in Opinion
99-07.5 The issue in
Opinion 99-07 was, “May a lawyer refer
a client to an investment advisor for investment and financial planning
and take a referral fee from the commission paid by the client to the
investment advisor?” The Committee concluded, “It is not
per se unethical for a lawyer to refer a client to an investment advisor
and take a referral fee from the commission paid to that advisor, although
the lawyer has a heavy burden to insure compliance with applicable ethical
rules.”
In our analysis in Opinion 99-07, we identified
multiple potential conflicts that may arise under such circumstances,
and the analysis, disclosures and consent the lawyer must undertake
and secure to comply with Rule 1.7.
For example, notwithstanding having given written approval for the
transaction, the client may later have concerns that the lawyer is
not providing unbiased advice or that loyalty to the client is compromised
by the financial arrangement with the investment advisor. It is possible
that the lawyer’s professional judgment might be compromised
by a motivation, overt or subconscious, to preserve the advisor’s
fee-sharing arrangement, even though a change in the client’s
financial interests might suggest some other arrangement. It is possible
a lawyer might be motivated to give the client different or inferior
legal advice due to the pecuniary interest involved with the financial
advisor. There is a potential conflict if the lawyer were asked to
mediate, litigate, or otherwise remedy a problem due to deficiencies
on the part of the financial advisor. There is the possibility that
the client might have been able to negotiate a lower commission had
the lawyer not been receiving a commission from the investment advisor,
and hence the arrangement might not be fair to the client. For example,
a lawyer performing estate-planning services for the client might
be in a position that is more likely to exert undue influence than
a lawyer providing entirely unrelated legal services. Additional issues
arise if the investment advisor is also a client of the lawyer.6
Opinion 99-07 notes that some jurisdictions
have concluded such referral arrangements are strictly prohibited, while
others have found them acceptable under carefully circumscribed conditions.
States prohibiting such referrals include New York, Kentucky, and Arizona,7
which conclude that the lawyer’s fee arrangement is likely to
interfere materially with the lawyer’s independent judgment. Other
states, including Connecticut and Missouri, conclude that the potential
for conflict, although high, does not establish a per se prohibition
against such referral arrangements.8
Our Committee agreed that application of Rule 1.7(b)
did not result in a per se proscription and outlined the conditions
under which lawyers—after careful consideration—might enter
into such arrangements.
Opinion 99-07 also found that the referral
transaction described there was a “business transaction with a
client” subject to Rule 1.8(a).
Neither the rule nor Opinion 99-07 expressly
defines what constitutes a “business transaction with a client,”
but we assume, for purposes of this opinion, that the lawyer referral
to a Co-op as described above is a business transaction and thus falls
within the scope of Rule 1.8 (a).
Our analysis of Rule 1.8 (a) in
Opinion 99-07 cited favorably to the lawyer’s
“to do list” set forth in a Connecticut Bar Association
opinion that conditionally approved such relationships. The Connecticut
Bar’s requirements were that the lawyer should:
(a) determin[e] that the obligations to the client would not be
compromised in any way; (b) assur[e] that the terms of the transaction
under which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable
to the client; (c) mak[e] full disclosure to the client in writing
to consider seeking the advice of an independent counsel; and (e)
giv[e] the client a reasonable opportunity to do so. The lawyer must
also clarify in writing whether she is performing legal services in
making the referral.9
Our analysis of Opinion 99-07 is important
here because the Co-op arrangement described above is less likely to
produce a non consentable conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(b)
or 1.8(a) than direct compensation
to a lawyer for referrals to investment advisors. This is because the
lawyer’s compensation from the Co-op is indirect and generated
from the Co-op’s general profits—not from an identifiable
and direct single referral. For example, the referring lawyer’s
compensation will not have a direct connection with the particular non
legal professional who provides the Co-op services and products when
(a) the referral to the Co-op does not involve a particular named professional10
or (b) the net profit payouts to the Co-op11
member are not directly associated with the particular clients that
the lawyer had referred to the Co-op. Hence, compliance with our admonitions
in Opinion 99-07 would necessarily satisfy
ethical concerns in the Co-op arrangement.
A final ethical consideration relates to the direct services that
may be provided to clients by Co-op personnel. To the extent that such
services would be “law-related,” as that term is defined
in ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.7, Utah Ethics Advisory
Opinion 98-08 concluded that “a law
firm [may] wholly own an accounting practice subsidiary for the lawyer’s
clients and others,” with the caveat that “the law firm
will be subject to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct with respect
to the provision of these law-related services in certain circumstances.”12
The requesting party here assumed that Co-op services would not be law-related
within the meaning of Opinion 98-08. However,
we assume that they are law-related, because the Co-op services, such
as trust administration, “might reasonably be performed in conjunction
with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services.”13
Our conclusion, however, does not turn on this assumption.
Summary: It is not per se unethical for a lawyer to
refer a client to a cooperative organization formed by the lawyer and
other lawyers to provide non-legal services and for the lawyer to participate
in the organization’s profit sharing. However, compliance with
Rule 1.7 and Rule 1.8
will be ensured if the Co-op lawyer making the referral is certain that
the following itemized check-list is satisfied:
(1) Objectively conclude that any identifiable conflicts between
the lawyer and the cooperative organization would not materially affect
the representation of that client;
(2) Affirm in writing to the client that the referral will not compromise
the client’s interests in any way;
(3) Conclude that the services provided by the cooperative organization
are being provided at fair and reasonable fees;
(4) Disclose that the lawyer will receive remuneration based on the
profitability of the cooperative organization;
(5) Advise the client to seek independent counsel as to the referral;14
and
(6) Secure the client’s consent.15
Footnotes
1. Utah has not yet adopted
ABA Model Rule 5.7, although two Utah ethics opinions have favorably
cited that rule. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. 98-08, 1998 WL 716635 (Utah
St. Bar); Utah Ethics Advisory Op. 02-04,
nn. 6-7, 2004 WL 448569 (Utah St. Bar).
2. Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.7 (b) (2004).
3. Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.8 (a) (2004). We note
that the current ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a)
requires that notice to the client to seek advice of independent counsel
must be in writing and that the client must sign any
informed consent. Utah has not yet adopted the new Model Rules, but
the process of considering their adoption, including ABA Model Rule
1.8, is currently under way. Lawyers
are advised to check the current version of the rule.
4. Annotated Model Rules
of Professional Conduct 5.7 (ABA 5th ed. 2003).
5. Utah Ethics Advisory
Op. 99-07, 1999 WL 1167097 (Utah St. Bar).
6. Id.
7. N.Y. Comm. on Prof. Ethics
Op. 682, 1996 WL 74860 (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n); Ky. Bar Ass’n
Ethics Comm. Formal Op. E-390 (July 1996); Ariz. Jud. Advisory Op. 98-02,
1999, WL 667267 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm.).
8. Conn. Ethics Op. 94-25,
1994 WL 780842 (Conn. Bar Ass’n); Mo. Bar Office of Chief Disciplinary
Counsel, Informal Adv. Op. 960124 (1996).
9. Conn. Ethics Op. 97-16,
1997 WL 700650 (Conn. Bar Ass’n).
10. Where the referring
lawyer would not specify a particular investment advisor, for example,
but the Co-op would provide a list of investment advisors from which
the client chooses.
11. That is, once the
lawyer sends the client to the Co-op, the amount of revenue to the Co-op
from the client would not generally be known to the individual referring
lawyer.
12. Utah Ethics Advisory
Op. 98-08, 1998 WL 716635 (Utah St. Bar).
13. Annotated Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 5.7 (ABA 5th ed. 2003). We note here,
as we did in Opinion 98-08, that certain
aspects of this opinion are consonant with the provisions of Model Rule
5.7. However, the conclusions of this opinion are drawn from our analysis
of the existing Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. We do not necessarily
endorse Model Rule 5.7; adoption of any such rule is within the purview
of the Utah Supreme Court.
14. See note
3, supra.
15. See note
3, supra.
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