Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 16-03

Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee
Opinion Number 16-03
Issued September 13, 2016


  1. When a client asks a lawyer to modify a fee arrangement, how do the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the following scenarios:

(A) client requests that the lawyer defer payment of earned fees

(i) with a security interest, either in the anticipated property division or                                       judgment award in the case or in the client’s business or other                                               nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of her fee; or

(ii) without a security interest;

(B) client requests that the lawyer change a contingency fee arrangement to a flat fee arrangement;

(C) client requests that the lawyer modify a flat fee or contingency percentage that  the Client has agreed to pay;

(D) client owes X to the lawyer, which is a reasonable fee and not disputed as such                  by the client, and the lawyer agrees to take less than that amount and consider                  the account is paid current;

(E) client owes X amount and the lawyer agrees to take less than that amount and                    consider the account paid current, but wants the full amount of X if case is                          successful; and

(F) client and attorney have a dispute as to the fees charged, but they agree on a compromise number, which the client pays.


  1.  A fee arrangement is a contract and subject to contract law.  But because a lawyer has a fiduciary relationship with her client, a change in the fee arrangement during the course of the lawyer’s representation of the client is subject to heightened scrutiny. Hazard, Geoffrey C. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, § 9.14, at 9-51 (“Hazard & Hodes”).  Rules 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (“URPC”) applies to all modifications of fee arrangements. It provides, in pertinent part:

(a)  A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an                                             unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to                           be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the                                   following:

(1)  the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2)  the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3)  the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

Ethics Advisory Opinion 15-02

Utah State Bar

Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee

Opinion Number 15-02

Issued February 10, 2015




1.  May an attorney representing a party in pending or existing litigation contact servants, agents, and employees of an organization, which is the opposing party, to discuss issues directly related to the litigation, if the attorney is aware the organization is represented by counsel in the matter?  Is it ethical for an attorney to make contact directly with in-house or corporate counsel, even if the attorney is aware that the organization is represented by outside counsel in the matter?  Is it ethical for an attorney to send a copy of correspondence or email to an organization’s employee where the original is directed to opposing counsel?


2.  The query before the Committee relates to the issue of the propriety of an attorney making contact with a servant, agent, or employee of an organization which is potentially or is in fact involved in litigation, where the contacting attorney knows or has reason to know that the organization is represented by counsel.  The related question pertains to the same issue, except that the contact in question is with the organization’s in-house or corporate counsel.  Lastly, is it ethical for an attorney to send a copy of correspondence to an employee, the original of which is directed to opposing counsel for an organization?


3.  Communications, concerning the subject matter of anticipated, proposed or current litigation, are improper, if the individual being contacted is either (1) an employee of the target organization within the current “control group,” or (2) the individual’s acts, omissions or statements in the matter might be imputed to the opposing organization.  Contact with in-house counsel may be permissible, depending on the circumstances, as discussed below.


 4.  This opinion involves what has sometimes been referred to as the “no contact without consent” rule.  Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (URPC), Rule 4.2, Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel, states the general rule as follows:

(a) General Rule. In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior consent, communicate with another’s client if authorized to do so by any law, rule, or court order,[1] in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted to that allowed by the law, rule or court order, or as authorized by paragraphs (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Rule.[2]

5.  As a general matter, subject to the exception that a lawyer may “communicate with another’s client if authorized to do so by any law, rule, or court order,” Rule 4.2 requires that a lawyer not communicate “about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.”  Rule 4.2(a) (emphasis added).  The Rule “applies to communications with any person who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates,” and “applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not permitted by this Rule.”  Comment (3) and (4) to Rule 4.2.  Rule 4.2 is broadly consistent with the general rules set forth in § 99, A Represented Nonclient – The General Anti-Contact Rule, The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers; See also The Law of Lawyering, Hazard, Hodes & Jarvis, §§ 4.01 and 41.02.

Ethics Advisory Opinion 13-04

Utah State Bar

Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee

Opinion Number 13-04

Issued September 30, 2013


 1.        The question before the Committee concerns federal criminal law practice in the District of Utah.  Although it may have general application, this Opinion is confined to that arena.   The question is whether it is ethical under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for a criminal defense attorney (hereafter “the attorney”) to advise a client/defendant (hereafter “the client”) to negotiate and enter into a plea agreement whereby the client, as an integral part of his plea of guilty, waives all post-conviction claims the client may have, including claims of ineffective assistance of the attorney, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon negotiating or entering in to the plea or waiver.



2.         The Committee concludes that it is a violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 for an attorney to counsel his client to enter into a plea agreement which requires the client to waive the attorney’s prospective possible ineffective assistance at sentencing or other postconviction proceedings.[1]


3.         Numerous federal courts, including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, have concluded that waivers of post-conviction rights by criminal defendants are valid and enforceable so long as there is an adequate plea colloquy and such pleas are entered knowingly and voluntarily.[2] The Committee’s opinion is confined to the limited question of whether the attorney can negotiate and advise a client to enter into a guilty plea agreement which waives all postconviction claims, including those based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, consistent with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Committee concludes that doing so would be a violation of Rule 1.7.  Under Rule 1.7(a), “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”  In relevant part, the Rule defines a “concurrent conflict of interest” as the existence of “a significant risk” that the lawyer’s representation of “one or more clients” “will be materially limited” “by a personal interest of the lawyer.”  Utah R. Prof. C. 1.7(a)(2).[3]

4.         A defendant’s waiver of the statutory right to direct appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable if the defendant has agreed to its terms knowingly and voluntarily.  United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300 (10th Cir.1998).  The issue of waiving the right to appeal is analyzed in the Tenth Circuit using the following factors:

(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice . . . (Citation omitted).

United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004).  Thus, given the third prong of the analysis, even in the presence of a waiver of appeal, a criminal defendant does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court.  Id.  Nevertheless the Committee’s Opinion is launched from the premise that the law is settled, certainly in the Tenth Circuit where this question arises, that a valid plea agreement waiver of either the right to appeal or  other collateral attack is entitled to be enforced according to its terms either on appeal or by way of collateral attack.  Such a waiver is subject to certain exceptions, e.g., where the agreement was involuntary or unknowing, where the court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, or where the agreement is otherwise unlawful, et cetera.  Numerous authorities exemplifying such exceptional circumstances are identified in the Tenth Circuit’s pivotal decision, United States v. Cockerham, supra n. 2, 237 F.3d at 1182.

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 11-03


Opinion No. 11-03
Issued November 15, 2011

1. ISSUE: Is it a violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for an attorney to ask a law student to undertake research using the law student’s free account and in breach of the student’s contract with Lexis and/or Westlaw?

2. OPINION: A lawyer who encourages or participates in a law student’s violation of the student’s contractual obligation to the electronic research service violates the Rules of Professional Conduct.

3. BACKGROUND: Certain electronic research services such as WESTLAW and LEXIS allow law students access to their services. That access is given to further the student’s education. The student is required to sign an agreement that the services will be used only for educational or non-profit use.

For example, Westlaw limits the student’s use to “Educational Purposes.” That term means:
“If User is a career services personnel, Educational Purposes include Westlaw access and use solely for placement purposes. Any other use, including any use in connection with User’s employment outside of the Law School and any Student internship or externship, is prohibited. Notwithstanding the foregoing, User may, however, access Westlaw by means of User’s Law Student Password for purposes of unpaid public internships or externships (excluding those sponsored by a state or local government or a court. Any other use, including any use in connection with the employment or externship of User, if User is a student, is prohibited. . . )”
Lexis defines appropriate use as:
“Students may request access to LexisNexis using their Law School Education ID . . . for academic purposes. Academic purposes include, but are not limited to:
Research skill improvement, such as improving research efficiency and sharpening your area of law research skills as you prepare for practice
Summer School or course work
Work as a professor’s research assistant
Internship or externship for school credit
Study for the Bar Exam
“Academic purposes” do not include research conducted for a law firm, corporation, or other entity (other than a professor or law school) that is paying the student to conduct research, or that is passing along the cost of research to a third party. These are deemed “commercial purposes.” 1
Numerous students have reported that practicing attorneys have conditioned initial or continuing employment as a law clerk upon the student’s violation of the agreement with the research services. In other instances, lawyers have knowingly used information retrieved from the electronic services in violation of the student’s contractual agreement.

4. ANALYSIS: When a lawyer hires a law clerk, the lawyer is hiring the clerk for the clerk’s services and not for access to the electronic database. The lawyer has no expectation that the law clerk will breach the contractual obligations for the benefit of the lawyer. Indeed, the lawyer’s obligation is to make certain that the law clerk not violate any of the contractual duties and responsibilities.
5. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.3 place obligations on a lawyer supervising non-lawyer assistants. A lawyer with supervisory authority over the non-lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. Further, the lawyer violates ethical obligations if the lawyer orders or with knowledge of the specific conduct (misuse of the electronic services) ratifies conduct of the non-lawyer which would be a violation of the lawyer’s own ethical duties. Finally, it is a violation of Rule 5.3 if the lawyer knows of unethical conduct by the non-lawyer and does not take steps to avoid the misconduct or take reasonable remedial actions.

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 09-01

Issued February 23, 2009
1. Issue: What are the ethical limits for the use of testimonials, dramatizations or fictionalized representations in lawyers’ advertising on television or web sites?

2. Opinion: Advertising may not be “false or misleading”. Testimonials or dramatizations may be false or misleading is there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable person will reach a conclusion for which there is no factual foundation or will form an unjustified expectation. The inclusion of appropriate disclaimer or qualifying language may prevent testimonials or dramatizations from being false or misleading.
3. Background: As this Committee explained in Opinion No. 00-02, “The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that public communication concerning a lawyer’s services (including any form of advertising) is commercial speech, enjoys First Amendment protection, and can be regulated only to further substantial state interests, and then only in the least restrictive manner possible. The cardinal rule concerning all public communication about a lawyer and her services is that the communication not be false or misleading.” 1
4. Since we issued our most recent opinion regarding advertising, Rule 7.1 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (and of the Model Rules) has been amended to include only the simple paragraph set forth below. The amendments deleted subsections (b) and (c) which had specified that a communication was “false or misleading” if it “is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve” or if “compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.” Instead these issues were dealt with less rigidly in the Comments to Rule 7.1. The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission that recommended these amendments to Rule 7.1 explained its rationale:
The Commission recommends deletion of this specification of a “misleading” communication because it is overly broad and can be interpreted to prohibit communications that are not substantially likely to lead a reasonable person to form a specific and unwarranted conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. . . . . The Commission also believes that a prohibition of all comparisons that cannot be factually substantiated is unduly broad. Whether such comparisons are misleading should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in terms of whether the particular comparison is substantially likely to mislead a reasonable person to believe that the comparison can be substantiated. . . . . 2
5. While some state regulators retained the old language and other regulators adopted detailed categories of statements that are “false or misleading,” a leading commentator and original draftsperson of the Model Rules recommends against such an approach:
In the end, the best course for state regulators is to adopt the current simple and direct language of Model Rule 7.1 and issue interpretive guidelines . . . .Attempts to impose more burdensome and categorical prohibitions are likely to lead to little but constitutional litigation. GEOFFREY HAZARD, W. WILLIAM HODES, AND PETER JARVIS, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (3rd) §55.3
6. Analysis: We issue the following “interpretive guidelines” relying upon suggestions of commentators, other state’s suggestions and case law. We also suggest that Utah lawyers be aware of Utah’s Truth in Advertising Statute, Utah Code Ann. §13-11a-1 et. seq; Utah’s Consumer Sales Practices Act, §13-11-1 et. seq. which prohibit deceptive acts or practices.

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 07-02

(Approved February 25, 1993)
May an attorney give a “second opinion” on a legal matter, when approached by a non-client who is represented by counsel?

Opinion: Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer, “[i]n representing a client,” from “communicat[ing] about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter.” A lawyer does not violate the letter or purposes of this rule by rendering a second opinion on a legal matter, when the lawyer is not “representing a client” on the same subject. However, the lawyer should make every effort neither to impair the first attorney-client relationship nor to use the consultation as a means of soliciting the represented party.
Rationale: Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer, in representing a client, from communicating with a party the lawyer knows is represented by another lawyer in the matter, “unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.” The main thrust of this rule is “to prevent situations in which a represented party may be taken advantage of by adverse counsel; . . .”1 Of course, an attorney cannot give advice to an unrepresented person with the exception of suggesting that he or she seek counsel.2
A lawyer does not violate the letter or purposes of Rule 4.2 by rendering a second opinion to a represented party, when the lawyer is not “representing a client” in the same matter. Under its express terms, Rule 4.2 applies only to situations in which the lawyer is “representing a client” in making the communications. Moreover, the situation is not one “in which [the] represented party may be taken advantage of by adverse counsel; . . .”3 The Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee is, therefore, of the view that an attorney does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct by rendering a second opinion, when the lawyer is not representing a client in the same matter.
This conclusion is supported by In re Mettler,4 where the Supreme Court of Oregon addressed the scope of DR7-104(A)(1), the predecessor to Rule 4.2. DR7-104(A) provided:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation . . . with a person he knows to be represented by a lawyer on that subject . . . .
The court concluded that the phrase “during the course of his representation of a client” acts “as a threshold requirement for unethical conduct” and that a lawyer, therefore, cannot violate the rule unless he or she communicates with a represented person in the course of representing a client.5
This conclusion is also consistent with the ethics advisory opinions of other jurisdictions. In 1987, Kentucky considered the issue and concluded that a lawyer may provide legal advice to a person who is represented by counsel and is seeking a second opinion. The opinion cautioned, however, that the lawyer must make every effort neither to impair the first relationship nor to use the consultation as a means of soliciting the client. The opinion also suggested that the lawyer should obtain the party’s consent to consult the first lawyer so that all significant facts can be taken into account in rendering the second opinion.6 In Philadelphia, a lawyer who is approached by a represented party may ask the party to review how his or her present lawyer is handling the case. However, the opinion advises lawyers to be prudent in questioning the represented parties and to exercise discretion in evaluating the work of other lawyers.7 (more…)

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 05-02

Issued April 28, 2005
1 Issue:
What is the ethical responsibility of an attorney serving as defense counsel in a criminal case, when expressly requested by the court at a sentencing hearing for information obtained from or about the defendant regarding the defendant’s prior convictions?

2 Opinion: An attorney may only answer such a query with the client’s informed consent. Otherwise, the attorney must respectfully decline to answer the court’s request in a manner that will not be misleading to the court. The attorney may respond by asserting the client’s right to remain silent, and the attorney’s ethical responsibilities or a by giving a similar explanation that does not disclose client confidences. 1
3 Facts: An attorney represents a defendant in a criminal case. At a sentencing hearing, the court requests information from the attorney regarding the defendant’s prior convictions. The attorney has obtained such information during the course of the representation from conducting an independent investigation or from a confidential communication with the client. After consultation, the client does not consent to the disclosure.
4 Applicable Rules:
Rule 1.6—Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client except as stated in paragraph (b), unless the client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent that the lawyer believes necessary . . . . (4) To comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 2
5 Rule 3.3—Candor Toward the Tribunal
(c) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client. 3
6 Rule 8.4—Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration or justice . . . . 4
7 The issue touches on a fundamental aspect of the attorney-client relationship, namely, confidentiality. A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of all information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. 5 The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. 6
8 Information given to an attorney by a client, including the client’s name, address and telephone number, is confidential, and the attorney is prohibited from disclosing such information under Rule 1.6 unless the client consents after consultation. 7 Information provided by an accused to his attorney in an initial telephone conference is confidential, even as against a request for such information by law enforcement authorities seeking to apprehend the accused client. 8 A disclosure of information harmful to the client would be utterly inconsistent with the relationship of trust and confidence protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, Rule 1.6 9 precludes disclosure by the lawyer, whether voluntary or in response to an inquiry from the court, absent informed consent from the client. (more…)

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 04-01

March 29, 2004
1 Issue:
What action, if any, may a lawyer for an employer ethically undertake on behalf of a vanished former employee who, along with the employer, has been named as a defendant in an action arising when the person was an employee?

2 Answer: Under certain narrowly prescribed conditions, an employer’s lawyer may ethically take limited action to protect the interests of the vanished former employee, provided the lack of direct contact with that defendant is brought to the attention of the relevant tribunal.
3 Facts: Plaintiff filed suit naming a company and its former employee as defendants. The employer concedes that the former employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment and has asked the company’s lawyers to represent the missing defendant. Absence of a formal answer to the complaint may result in a default judgment being entered against the absent former employee. We have no information about the reasons for the employee’s absence, but we assume that a reasonable effort has been made to locate the person and determine the reason for the absence. We also assume that, at this early stage of the proceeding, the interests of the employer and former employee are not in conflict.1The lawyer requesting this opinion also indicated that the employer has liability insurance that covers the incident giving rise to the lawsuit.2The company has requested that the lawyer represent the missing ex-employee.
4 Analysis: This case presents two fundamental, but competing ethical principles: On the one hand, a basic ingredient of the representation of a client is that, under Rule 1.4, the lawyer communicate with the client, keep the client informed about the status of the case, and provide sufficient information to the client that he may make informed decision.3On the other hand, lawyers have a general obligation to advance the administration of justice.4
5 A formal application of Rule 1.4, without reference to any other parts of the Rules of Professional Conduct, would produce the following syllogism: The lawyer hasn’t communicated with the absent ex-employee and cannot formally satisfy the requirements of Rule 1.4; a violation of Rule 1.4 constitutes an ethical transgression; ergo, the lawyer may not ethically represent the ex-employee. Yet, we find this result inconsistent with the greater public policy of providing safeguards for an individual’s rights to the extent practicable and when it can be done without infringing on the rights of others. After all, the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct are “rules of reason . . . [that] should be interpreted with reference to the purpose of legal representation.”5
6 Further, before a mechanical application of Rule 1.4 to the absent defendant leads us to conclude that lack of initial attorney-client communication mandates no representation, we consider the intent of Rule 1.4. It is constructed around the normal relationship of an attorney-client contact already having been established and provides the guidelines that require a lawyer to keep that client properly informed “to the extent the client is willing and able” to be so informed.6Here, for reasons that are not known—and perhaps not contemplated by the drafters and adopters of the Rules—the (prospective) client is not “willing and able.” Without further analysis, we, therefore, decline to conclude that Rule 1.4 prevents all forms of representation of the missing employee.

04-04 – In litigation to enforce an oral contract allegedly made by a corporate defendant’s former employee

August 25, 2004

1 Issue: In litigation to enforce an oral contract allegedly made by a corporate defendant’s former employee on behalf of the corporation, where the former employee was not a member of the control group, may the plaintiff’s attorney contact the ex-employee without the consent of the corporate defendant’s attorney?

2 Answer: The contact with the former employee is not unethical. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2 (2004) does not bar a lawyer’s unauthorized contact with former employees of a represented corporate defendant except in very limited circumstances not applicable to this opinion.
3 Facts: A corporate defendant is represented by a lawyer in the defense of a claim based on an oral agreement allegedly made by a former employee of the corporate defendant while employed by the corporate defendant. The former employee was not a member of the “control group” as this term is defined in Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2(c) (2) (2004), but the former employee did have authority to enter into contracts. The former employee is not separately represented by legal counsel with respect to the matter. We are asked whether the lawyer representing the corporate defendant represents the former employee with respect to the matter under Rule 4.2(c)(1)(B)(iii), thereby precluding plaintiff’s counsel from communicating with the former employee with respect to the matter without complying with Rule 4.2(a).
4 Analysis: In 1991, the ABA’s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility addressed whether Model Rule 4.2 limits contacts with former employees. In ABA Formal Opinion 91-359 (1991), the ABA Committee concluded it does not. In pertinent part, the opinion provides:
While the Committee recognizes that persuasive policy arguments can be and have been made for extending the ambit of Model Rule 4.2 to cover some former corporate employers [sic], the fact remains that the text of the Rule does not do so and the comment gives no basis for concluding that such coverage was intended. Especially where, as here, the effect of the Rule is to inhibit the acquisition of information about one’s case, the Committee is loath, given the text of Model Rule 4.2 and its Comment, to expand its coverage to former employees by means of liberal interpretation.
Accordingly, it is the opinion of the Committee that a lawyer representing a client in a matter adverse to a corporate party that is represented by another lawyer may, without violating Model Rule 4.2, communicate about the subject of the representation with an unrepresented former employee of the corporate party without the consent of the corporation’s lawyer.
5 The only Utah court to have carefully considered this issue followed the ABA’s interpretation of Model Rule 4.2 at a time when Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2 mirrored the Model Rule. In Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 139 F.R.D. 412 (D. Utah 1991), plaintiff’s counsel sought to interview 24 former bank tellers regarding bank practices during the time an employee allegedly fraudulently endorsed checks. The court held:
Today this court joins the ranks of those which have construed Rule 4.2 consistently with the position taken by the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Under this court’s rules of practice, Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 as well as ABA Model Rule 4.2 do not prohibit ex parte contact with the former employees of an organizational party that is represented by counsel.

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 03-04

Issued October 14, 2003
1 Issue
: May a lawyer threaten to present criminal charges against an opposing party or witness during negotiations in a private civil matter?

2 Opinion: In the course of representing a client in a civil matter, it is not per se unethical for a lawyer to threaten that the client may pursue criminal charges against an adverse party where the civil and criminal matters are related. However, such a threat will be a violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct if it constitutes “extortion,” if the lawyer does not have a reasonable belief that such charges are warranted by the law and the facts, or if it involves “abusive treatment” of a witness.
3 Background: This query arose when counsel, during a mediation, stated that the opposing party’s witness was in violation of Utah law and that the County Attorney’s office “would be interested” to learn of the alleged violation.
4 The Former Rule. Prior Disciplinary Rule 7-105 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility barred a lawyer from using criminal charges to gain leverage in a civil action: “A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”1 The stated intent of DR 7-105 was to prevent lawyers from using the criminal justice system for oppressive purposes, and the rule set the boundaries of acceptable lawyer conduct clearly.
5 The drafters of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), however, deliberately left out the provisions of DR 7-105. The rationale behind this omission was the drafters’ belief that “extortionate, fraudulent, or otherwise abusive threats were covered by other, more general prohibitions in the Model Rules and thus that there was no need to outlaw such threats specifically.”2 The prior rule was thought to be overbroad because it prohibited legitimate pressure tactics and negotiation strategies.3 The current Utah Rules of Professional Conduct also include no analog to DR 7-105, but instead prohibit a lawyer from using “means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person”4 and from engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [or] . . . in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”5
6 ABA Opinion 92-363: The American Bar Association addressed the permissibility of threats in 1992 in Formal Opinion 92-363 (“Opinion 363”). Opinion 363 concluded that a lawyer may use the possibility of presenting criminal charges against the opposing party in a private civil matter to gain relief for the client, as long as the criminal and civil matters are related, the lawyer has a reasonable belief that threat is warranted by the law and the facts, and the lawyer does not suggest she possesses improper influence over the criminal process or try to exert such influence.6 Correspondingly, a lawyer may agree to refrain from presenting criminal charges as part of a settlement so long as the agreement does not violate applicable law.7
7 The same factors apply to threats against an opposing party’s witness. Opinion 363 notes that “abusive treatment” of witnesses may implicate Model Rule 4.4. Abusive treatment exists if the lawyer’s purpose in suggesting charges may be brought is merely to embarrass, delay or burden a third person. If, however, the lawyer has a well-founded belief that criminal charges related to the civil action may be justified, and the lawyer does not suggest the presence of improper influence over the criminal process, the conduct is not abusive.

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 02-05

Issued March 18, 2002
1 Issue:
What are the ethical considerations for a governmental lawyer who participates in a lawful covert governmental operation, such as a law enforcement investigation of suspected illegal activity or an intelligence gathering activity, when the covert operation entails conduct employing dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit?

2 Conclusion: A governmental lawyer who participates in a lawful covert governmental operation that entails conduct employing dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit for the purpose of gathering relevant information does not, without more, violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.1
3 Background: A bar member who works for a federal agency that routinely performs undercover investigative work and covert actions directed against criminal and terrorist groups asks whether supervision of or participation in those activities violates Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), which states that: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Similar issues are raised by federal and state prosecutors’ supervision of undercover criminal investigations.
4 Analysis: On its face, Rule 8.4(c) would seem to make it professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in any kind of misrepresentation. However, the Official Comment to Rule 8.4 is read by some to restrict its range to a more limited scope of illegal conduct:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving “moral turpitude.”. . . Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category.
Relying on the Comment, commentators David Isbell and Lucantonio Salvi have concluded that Rule 8.4(c) is intended to “apply only to conduct of so grave a character as to call into question the lawyer’s fitness to practice law” and does not apply to deception by undercover investigators.2Furthermore, Congress, in its report on Abscam, indicated that “[i]n this era of increasingly powerful and sophisticated criminals, some use of the undercover technique is indispensable to the achievement of effective law enforcement.”3
5 Surprisingly, there is little authority bearing directly on the issue of whether Rule 8.4(c) applies to lawyer participation in lawful government covert operations. We are aware of no bar ethics opinions that have faced this question squarely.4A recent ABA opinion does hold that a lawyer’s recording of a conversation without the knowledge or consent of the other party does not necessarily violate the Model Rules.5It specifically reserves, however, the question presented here:
The Committee does not address in this opinion the application of the Model Rules to deceitful, but lawful conduct by lawyers, either directly or through supervision of the activities of agents and investigators, that often accompanies nonconsensual recording of conversations in investigations of criminal activity, discriminatory practices, and trademark infringement. We conclude that the mere act of secretly but lawfully recording a conversation inherently is not deceitful, and leave for another day the separate question of when investigative practices involving misrepresentations of identity and purpose nonetheless may be ethical.6

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 01-01

Issued January 26, 2001
1 Issue:
Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, may an attorney representing a client in a divorce case assert a statutory attorney’s lien under Utah Code Ann. § 78-54-41 against property awarded to the client in the divorce settlement?

2 Discussion: Rule 1.8(a). We first address a threshold question: Does the invocation of a statutory attorney’s lien require the attorney to meet the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which generally governs business transactions between lawyers and their clients?
3 Pursuant to Rule 1.8(a), a lawyer may not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless (1) the transaction and terms of the transaction are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client, (2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction, and (3) the client consents in writing to the transaction.
4 Rule 1.8(j) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may . . . acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses . . . .”1
5 Utah statute provides for an attorney to be granted an attorney’s lien on the proceeds of a cause of action in which a lawyer represents a client:
The compensation of an attorney and counselor for services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim or at the time that the attorney and client enter into a written or oral employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed has a lien upon the client’s cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client’s favor and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever2hands they may come, and cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment. Any written employment agreement shall contain a statement that the attorney has a lien upon the client’s cause of action or counterclaim.3
6 The threshold question is, therefore, whether a lawyer may assert a lien under § 78-51-41 only if she satisfies the conditions of Rule 1.8(a), which govern a “business transaction” with a client and the knowing acquisition of an interest adverse to a client.
7 We conclude that Rule 1.8(a) is not applicable to the statutory lien situation. It is not reasonable to read this rule so narrowly that a statutory lien becomes a “business transaction” subject to Rule 1.8(a)’s conditions.4The statutory lien in question is a right of public record granted by the Legislature and is not the kind of adverse interest contemplated by Rule 1.8(a). Additionally, statutory attorney liens are specifically authorized by Rule 1.8(j)(1). Therefore, a lawyer does not violate Rule 1.8(a) by entering into a fee agreement with a client and subsequently enforcing that agreement by asserting a claim under § 78-51-41.5

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 99-06

(Approved August 27, 1999)
: As a part of a criminal plea bargain agreement in a DUI case, may either the prosecuting attorney or the defense lawyer seek the concurrence of the investigating police officer not to respond to a subpoena lawfully issued by the Utah Driver License Division in connection with the related driver-license revocation hearing, a state administrative proceeding?

Opinion: No. Such conduct violates Rule 3.4(a) and 8.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
Facts: In cases involving operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), two actions are initiated. The first is the criminal DUI action. The second is an administrative hearing before the Driver License Division of the Utah Department of Public Safety (“DLD”) to consider whether to revoke or suspend the defendant’s driver license (the “DLD hearing”).
In connection with the DLD hearing, the investigating police officer is served with a subpoena to appear at that hearing. Before the DLD hearing takes place, the defendant’s lawyer and the prosecuting attorney1agree to resolve the criminal DUI action. As a part of the plea-bargain discussion or after the agreement is reached, but before the DLD hearing, either the defendant’s lawyer or the prosecuting attorney contacts the investigating officer to indicate that (1) a compromise or a “deal” has been worked out concerning the charge against the defendant, and (2) a part of the deal is that the police officer will not appear at the DLD hearing. Notwithstanding the issued subpoena, non-appearance forecloses the presentation of any evidence against the defendant at the DLD hearing and is tantamount to “saving” the defendant’s license from being suspended or revoked. As a result of the investigating officer’s non-appearance at the DLD hearing, the administrative action is dismissed, and no action is taken relating the defendant’s driver’s license.
Analysis: Section 76-8-508 of the Utah Code provides:
A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to . . . (b) withhold any testimony, information, document, item; (c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or (d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been summoned.2
On the facts related to the Committee in this request, a major element of the overall plea-bargain arrangement is the agreement that the subpoenaed police officer will not testify or, at least, will be asked to concur with the “deal” and not respond to the DLD subpoena. In the process of striking such a plea bargain on the DUI charge, if either the defense lawyer or the prosecuting attorney has induced (or attempted to induce) the police officer not to respond to a validly issued subpoena to appear at the DLD hearing, that lawyer appears to be in violation of Utah law.
Rule 8.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct specifies when a violation of the law constitutes an ethical transgression: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [c]ommit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects”3or to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”4 (more…)

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 97-05

(Approved April 25, 1997)
Issue No. 1: Is it ethical for an attorney to receive payment for legal services other than in money?
Opinion: The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct permit an attorney to accept payment for legal services in a form other than money. All arrangements for payment of an attorney’s fees, however, must comply with the applicable provisions of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct concerning fees and the attorney-client relationship.
Issue No. 2: Is it ethical for an attorney to barter legal services through a barter exchange?

Opinion: Although an attorney’s bartering of legal services through a barter exchange is not prohibited per se by the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, such bartering is unethical if the attorney’s conduct or the structure, terms, or conditions of the attorney’s arrangements with the barter exchange violate any of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
Analysis: The request for this opinion asks generally, without presenting specific facts and circumstances, whether attorneys ethically may receive payment for legal services other than in money, such as through barter exchanges. The request also asks whether Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 50, issued August 25, 1978, is still valid, noting that questions concerning an attorney’s participation in barter exchanges are of continuing interest in Utah.
Payment of Attorneys’ Fees Other Than in Money. Nothing in the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct requires that an attorney’s fees be paid in money. The fundamental requirement of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct is that an attorney’s fees must be reasonable.1
Rule 1.5(b) requires a written communication concerning the basis or rate of an attorney’s fee when the lawyer has not regularly represented the client and it is reasonably foreseeable that total attorneys’ fees to the client will exceed $750.00. A determination of whether the $750.00 threshold will be met in a particular case requires that attorneys’ fees be evaluated in terms of their dollar amount.
However, Rule 1.5 does not require that payment for legal services be made in money. The following official comment to Rule 1.5 states that an attorney may accept property in payment for fees:
A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to special scrutiny because it involves questions concerning both the value of the services and the lawyer’s special knowledge of the value of the property.
As this comment illustrates, no arrangement for payment of an attorney’s fees, whether in money, property or services, should violate any of the prohibited transaction rules of Rule 1.8. For example, an arrangement for payment of attorneys’ fees that involves the acquisition of a pecuniary interest adverse to a client in violation of Rule 1.8(a) is prohibited. Any arrangement for payment of attorneys’ fees that involves giving the lawyer literary or media rights in violation of Rule 1.8(d) is prohibited. Accepting reimbursement of costs other than in money in a way that provides for an improper advance of costs or expenses could also violate the financial assistance restrictions of Rule 1.8(e).

Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 97-07

(Approved May 30, 1997)
: Is a lawyer, acting as a trustee under the United States Bankruptcy Code, required to maintain bankruptcy estate trust funds in a financial institution that complies with check-overdraft reporting requirements described in Rule 1.15?

Opinion: No. A lawyer, acting as a trustee under the United States Bankruptcy Code, is not required to maintain funds in a financial institution that complies with the check-overdraft reporting requirements of Rule 1.15, because the administration of such bankruptcy funds is not the practice of law.
Facts: Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1302, the United States Trustee appointed a lawyer as a Chapter 13 trustee for the District of Utah.1As a Chapter 13 trustee, the lawyer is a fiduciary for Chapter 13 estates created upon filing a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. On behalf of the Chapter 13 estate, the trustee receives money from Chapter 13 debtors. The trustee is bonded, submits regular reports and is audited on a regular basis by the United States Trustee.
Analysis: Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15 now requires a lawyer to enter an agreement with any financial institution where that lawyer has client or third-party trust funds. Under the agreement, the financial institution will report any non-sufficient checks or check overdrafts to the Office of Attorney Discipline.2
However, most of the Rules of Professional Conduct govern a lawyer’s actions only in the providing of legal services or in the practice of law. For example, an attorney’s direct-mail advertising of mediation and arbitration services is not prohibited under Rule 7.3 since mediation and arbitration services are not the practice of law.3This is true of Rule 1.15. Rule 1.15 states that the rule applies only to property “in connection with a representation.” The Comment to Rule 1.15 also suggests that Rule 1.15 only applies in the practice of law.4
The administration of a Chapter 13 trust is not the practice of law. The Bankruptcy Code does not require that a bankruptcy trustee be a lawyer.5The bankruptcy trustee has no attorney-client relationship with either the debtor or with any of the creditors. The bankruptcy trustee does not act as an advocate for or represent any of the parties. Therefore, a lawyer practicing as a Chapter 13 trustee is not required to conform with the requirements of Rule 1.15 in maintaining Chapter 13 funds.
Provisions other than Rule 1.15 exist to protect Chapter 13 funds. As a bankruptcy trustee, the lawyer must be bonded.6The United States Trustee regularly audits the lawyer, and the lawyer submits periodic reports to the United States Trustee. Finally, a lawyer acting as a trustee, even a Chapter 13 trustee, is still subject to Rule 8.4 for any misconduct in the handling of trust funds.7
This opinion that Rule 1.15 does not govern the Chapter 13 trustee’s actions applies only to the supervision of bankruptcy trust funds. If the lawyer, acting as a bankruptcy trustee, also maintains a non-bankruptcy estate trust fund for a client or a third party, that fund may be subject to Rule 1.15.
1.Although this opinion involves a Chapter 13 trustee, the analysis and result would be the same for other bankruptcy trustees.